



Security Assessment

TheKillBox

Dec 2nd, 2021





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Disclaimer

About

Summary

This report has been prepared for TheKillBox to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the TheKillBox project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	TheKillBox
Platform	bsc
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://bscscan.com/address/0x3523d58d8036B1C5C9A13493143c97aEfC5Ad422
Commit	

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	Dec 02, 2021
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Key Components	ERC20

Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total	⚠ Pending	⊗ Declined	ℹ Acknowledged	⚠ Partially Resolved	✓ Resolved
● Critical	0	0	0	0	0	0
● Major	2	0	0	2	0	0
● Medium	0	0	0	0	0	0
● Minor	2	1	0	1	0	0
● Informational	5	0	0	5	0	0
● Discussion	0	0	0	0	0	0

Audit Scope

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum
KBX	KBOXToken.sol	c8309b8536a35307481a50d2733a2d5837a26dda56480e0776db431b28512d4a

Overview

TheKillBox created a standard ERC20 token with the `minter` role that can mint `KB0XToken` tokens before the circulating tokens number surpasses the total supply.

The auditors have confirmed that the contract `KB0XToken` has been deployed at address [0x3523d58d8036B1C5C9A13493143c97aEfC5Ad422](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3523d58d8036B1C5C9A13493143c97aEfC5Ad422).


Privileged Roles

To set up the project correctly, improve overall project quality and preserve upgradability, the following roles are adopted in the codebase:

- The `owner` role is adopted in contract `Ownable` to transfer/renounce the ownership.
- The `owner` role is adopted in contract `KB0XToken` to add/delete/get minters.
- The `minter` role is adopted in contract `KB0XToken` to mint `KB0XToken` tokens.

To improve the trustworthiness of the project, dynamic runtime updates in the project should be notified to the community. Any plan to invoke the aforementioned functions should be also considered to move to the execution queue of the `Timelock` contract.

Findings



■ Critical	0 (0.00%)
■ Major	2 (22.22%)
■ Medium	0 (0.00%)
■ Minor	2 (22.22%)
■ Informational	5 (55.56%)
■ Discussion	0 (0.00%)

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
KBX-01	Centralization Risk	Centralization / Privilege	● Major	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-02	Initial Token Distribution	Centralization / Privilege	● Major	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-03	Potential Integer Underflow	Mathematical Operations	● Minor	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-04	Unlocked Compiler Version	Language Specific	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-05	Multiple <code>pragma</code> Being Declared	Language Specific	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-06	Redundant Internal Function	Coding Style, Gas Optimization	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-07	Function Can be Declared as <code>external</code>	Gas Optimization	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-08	Lack of Event Emission for Significant Transactions	Coding Style	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
KBX-09	Burning Tokens Not Affecting TotalSupply	Logical Issue	● Minor	ⓘ Pending

KBX-01 | Centralization Risk

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	● Major	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 692, 701, 1019, 1027, 1032, 1045	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

In contract `Ownable`, the `owner` role has the authority over the following functions:

- `Ownable.renounceOwnership()`: Renounce the ownership of the contract and set the `owner` address to the zero address.
- `Ownable.transferOwnership()`: Transfer the ownership of the contract to an arbitrary non-zero address.

In contract `KBOXToken`, the `minter` role has the authority over the following function:

- `KBOXToken.mint()`: Mint any amount of `KBOXToken` tokens before reaching the `totalSupply` to an arbitrary address.

In contract `KBOXToken`, the `owner` role has the authority over the following functions:

- `KBOXToken.addMinter()`: Grant the `minter` role to an arbitrary non-zero address.
- `KBOXToken.delMinter()`: Retract an address's `minter` role.
- `KBOXToken.getMinter()`: Get the list of addresses with the `minter` role.

Any compromise to any account with any privileged role may allow the hacker to take advantage of this and disrupt operations involving this token.

Recommendation

We advise the client to carefully manage the `owner` and `minter` accounts' private keys carefully to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol to be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., Multisignature wallets.

Indicatively, here is some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at the different level in term of short-term and long-term:

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;

- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key;
- Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement.

Alleviation

[CertiK]: The auditors have confirmed that the contract `KB0XToken` has been deployed at address [0x3523d58d8036B1C5C9A13493143c97aEfC5Ad422](https://bscscan.com/address/0x3523d58d8036B1C5C9A13493143c97aEfC5Ad422).

According to the information available on [bscscan](https://bscscan.com) at UTC 7:00 PM, November 23rd, 2021, the owner of contract `KB0XToken` is [0x8F6e763B47257d7D2B277ea1562dd77C34C4e9e1](https://bscscan.com/address/0x8F6e763B47257d7D2B277ea1562dd77C34C4e9e1), which is an externally owned account. There is no account being granted with `minter` role at UTC 7:00 PM, November 23rd, 2021.

KBX-02 | Initial Token Distribution

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	● Major	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 1015	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

All of the `KBOXToken` tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This could be a centralization risk as the deployer can distribute `KBOXToken` tokens without obtaining the consensus of the community.

Recommendation

We recommend the team be transparent regarding the initial token distribution process, and the team shall make enough efforts to restrict the access of the private key.

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

KBX-03 | Potential Integer Underflow

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Mathematical Operations	● Minor	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 1046	📄 Acknowledged

Description

In the function `KBOXToken.getMinter()`, the input `_index` is checked to ensure the index is valid. However, it is possible that `getMinterLength() == 0` which might lead to integer underflow in the calculation:

```
1046         require(_index <= getMinterLength() - 1, "KBOXToken: index out of  
bounds");
```

Recommendation

We advise the client to use the SafeMath library for all of the mathematical operations.

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

KBX-04 | Unlocked Compiler Version

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Language Specific	● Informational	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 6	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

The contract has unlocked compiler version. An unlocked compiler version in the source code of the contract permits the user to compile it at or above a particular version. This, in turn, leads to differences in the generated bytecode between compilations due to differing compiler version numbers. This can lead to an ambiguity when debugging as compiler specific bugs may occur in the codebase that would be hard to identify over a span of multiple compiler versions rather than a specific one.

Recommendation

We advise that the compiler version is instead locked at the lowest version possible that the contract can be compiled at. For example, for version `v0.6.2` the contract should contain the following line:

```
pragma solidity 0.6.2;
```

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

KBX-05 | Multiple `pragma` Being Declared

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Language Specific	● Informational	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 6, 29, 109, 327, 643, 711	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

There are multiple `pragma` declarations on the aforementioned lines.

Recommendation

We recommend removing the redundant `pragma` declarations.

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

KBX-06 | Redundant Internal Function

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style, Gas Optimization	● Informational	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 619	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

The function `ERC20._setupDecimals()` has the `internal` visibility. However, it is not called by any function in the contract `ERC20`.

Recommendation

We recommend removing the redundant function `ERC20._setupDecimals()`.

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

KBX-07 | Function Can be Declared as `external`

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Gas Optimization	● Informational	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 387, 395, 412, 426, 438, 446, 457, 475, 493, 512, 566, 692, 701, 1019, 1027, 1032, 1045	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

The following functions are never called by the contract, so they can be declared `external` to save gas:

- `ERC20.name()`
- `ERC20.symbol()`
- `ERC20.decimals()`
- `ERC20.balanceOf()`
- `ERC20.transfer()`
- `ERC20.allowance()`
- `ERC20.approve()`
- `ERC20.transferFrom()`
- `ERC20.increaseAllowance()`
- `ERC20.decreaseAllowance()`
- `ERC20.burn(uint256)`
- `Ownable.renounceOwnership()`
- `Ownable.transferOwnership()`
- `KBOXToken.mint()`
- `KBOXToken.addMinter()`
- `KBOXToken.delMinter()`
- `KBOXToken.getMinter()`

Recommendation

We recommend changing the visibilities of the functions on the aforementioned lines to `external`.

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

KBX-08 | Lack of Event Emission for Significant Transactions

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	● Informational	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 1027, 1032	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

The following functions that affect the status of sensitive variables should emit events for better tracking contract status:

- `KBOXToken.addMinter()`: Grant the `minter` role to an arbitrary non-zero address.
- `KBOXToken.delMinter()`: Retract an address's `minter` role.

Recommendation

We recommend adding events for the aforementioned sensitive actions, and emitting the events within the functions.

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

KBX-09 | Burning Tokens Not Affecting TotalSupply

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● Minor	projects/KBOXToken/KBOXToken.sol (015d0d3): 587	ⓘ Pending

Description

While burning `KBOXTokens`, the `_totalSupply` of `KBOXToken` will not decrease. We want to check with the team whether this is an intended design.

Alleviation

[TheKillBox]: The team acknowledged the issue and decided not to make any changes to the current version.

Appendix

Finding Categories

Centralization / Privilege

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation findings relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how `block.timestamp` works.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of `private` or `delete`.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.

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